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Despite a massive worldwide crisis of biodiversity loss, there have been consid-
erable successes in global conservation.1 An ever-increasing amount of land is
contained in protected areas, which now cover over 12 percent of the world’s
land surface area, and over 25 percent in some countries.2 International conser-
vation NGOs are growing in size and inºuence, and global political structures
give increasing prominence to conservation issues.3 Representations of bio-
diversity as exotic and endangered, occupying places where humans are destruc-
tive intruders, have become ubiquitous. Accompanying these successes have
been profound changes in the way conservation works. Conservation is increas-
ingly planned at a global scale. The roles of NGOs, corporations, and the state
are increasingly indistinguishable. Market mechanisms and logics are becoming
seen as the only way to do effective conservation.4
This article argues that at the heart of this trend lies a well-connected and
networked elite, shaping conservation discourses and practices. It draws its
membership from across NGOs, states, corporations, science, and the media
and it works through personal contacts. Elite connections have been central
since the emergence of a global conservation movement over a century ago,5 but
the current elite is bigger, more diverse, more powerful, more effectively struc-
tured and more inºuential than the elites of the past. Its emergence and
structure are consequences of shifts in global environmental governance and
1. Although there are many understandings of conservation (Adams 2005), here it is deªned as
the protection of nature, particularly as biodiversity and in its threatened parts, for its own in-
trinsic value through protecting the places in which it is found. This is distinct from environ-
mentalism, a concern for humanity’s relationship with nature in general.
2. IUCN-UNEP 2005.
3. Chapin 2004; and Princen and Finger 1994.
4. Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 2008.
5. Adams 2005; Brockington 2009; Jacoby 2001; and Mackenzie 1988.
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the global political economy of nature. Here I outline the shape and workings
of the elite, contributing to an emerging body of literature on changes in the or-
ganization and functioning of conservation.
The paper begins by reviewing the literature on the neoliberalization of
conservation, the movement towards a decreased role of the state and a greater
role for civil society and markets in conservation. It then explores the different
parts of the transnational conservation elite—NGOs, the state, corporations, in-
tellectuals, and the media—focusing on the interactions among them. A series
of vignettes showing the elite in action brieºy illustrates the arguments, show-
ing how the elite functions and how money, inºuence, and ideas are mobilized.
The conclusion considers the potential for global conservation hegemony
posed by the elite.
While conservation involves diverse actors, discourses, and policies, this
argument concerns one small part of this phenomenon. The argument refers to
actors who have global-scale (or at least continental) goals, and who can move
inºuence, money, discourses, and other resources of power around the world
with relative ease. These processes and actors are distinct from, and may have a
fractured relationship with, those operating at national or local scales. The pic-
ture presented here generally portrays a powerful and relatively successful con-
servation elite, yet it is but one part of a wider picture. Neoliberalized conserva-
tion is not homogenous worldwide, but skips around, strongly present in some
places but absent in others.6
The claims made here are based on a reading of the existing literature on
global conservation, rather than on original empirical data. There are a number
of studies of global conservation at work, from ethnographies of conservation
meetings to insider accounts of conservation NGOs’ strategies. Taken collec-
tively, this expanding body of work points to the existence of a transnational
conservation elite, and allows an exploration of how it functions. In describing
the elite and its links and connections, the article aims to inform and guide fur-
ther research into conservation politics and its neoliberalization.
Elites, Neoliberalism, and Conservation
The argument made here takes inspiration from two bodies of literature: one fo-
cused on the emergence of global networks of actors working around global en-
vironmental issues and the other focused on the neoliberalization of nature.
Within the former, studies reveal how new institutions, mechanisms, and tech-
niques to deal with particular global environmental problems are created as di-
verse actors come together.7 Literature on epistemic communities explores the
coalitions of knowledge producers forming around certain issues.8 Others dis-
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6. Brockington and Scholªeld 2009.
7. Adger et al. 2001.
8. Berkes 2004.
cuss discursive coalitions: diverse actors from a broad range of organizations
and backgrounds who loosely coalesce around, develop, thrive upon, and sus-
tain particular storylines of environmental change.9 Struggles in environmental
politics are battles to assert discursive hegemony: to ensure that one’s own
storyline is taken to be the authoritative, accepted version, forming the basis for
policy. These ideas all describe a broad mix of actors from a range of institutions
and constituencies coming together to shape how a certain issue is thought
about, discussed, and acted upon. They ªt well with modern writings on elites
which deªne elites not as a ªxed upper tier in society, but as groups of individu-
als distinguished by their disproportionate inºuence in particular areas.10 This
approach is based on ideas of societal networks, where inºuence is transient
and context-speciªc and works through relationships. There can be multiple
elites, working at different scales and inºuencing different issues. Elite member-
ship is heterogeneous—for example, parliamentarians are often viewed as the
quintessential elites, yet television presenters and academics can also be highly
inºuential, albeit in different ways.
In recent years, scholars from across a number of disciplines have argued
that changes in governments, markets, and business across the globe over the
last three decades are part of a wider process of neoliberalization. Although the
term has been used to describe a very broad range of phenomena, it is com-
monly used to describe the movement towards the rolling back and shrinking
of the state and the growing role of civil society, markets, and market mecha-
nisms in providing services. Neoliberalism refers to the ideas and theories be-
hind it. Within this process, geographers and other cognate disciplines have
identiªed a process of neoliberalization of nature, whereby the control and
ownership of bits of nature, and the economic and political forces to which na-
ture is subject, are changing in line with this general movement. While there is
no one neoliberalization of nature—it varies across scales and between places—
some common features have been identiªed.11 Pieces of previously state-
controlled or commonly held nature are increasingly being privatized. Nature is
increasingly given a value and turned into a global market commodity. The state
is rolling back, decreasing regulation of nature and its use, except where it is re-
regulating nature to facilitate privatization and marketization. Market logics of
efªciency and competitiveness are increasingly incorporated into the state and
civil society. The interchanging of roles between the state civil society and cor-
porations, and the shared faith in market logics, has blurred the boundaries be-
tween for-proªt, non-proªt, and state. Neoliberalization of nature is increas-
ingly recognized as a process, a transformation of society. It is a deepened and
extended trend, rather than something radically new.12
Conservation has always been part of wider political structures, such as na-
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9. Hajer 1995.
10. Woods 1998.
11. For the best exploration of this complex topic, see Castree 2008a and 2008b.
12. Castree 2008a and 2008b.
tionalism, colonialism, and earlier forms of capitalism, and it has naturally be-
come affected by neoliberalism.13 By studying NGOs, corporations, and state
bureaucracies, a few key features of conservation’s neoliberalization have been
identiªed.14 First, following general neoliberal principles of state roll-back, the
state’s role in conservation has been widely reduced, except where it has been
redeployed to regulate and facilitate markets. It has been replaced by corporate
actors and especially by NGOs, who have never before had such a close relation-
ship with government. States are increasingly entering into arrangements for
joint governance of issues and places, such as running protected areas, with
other organizations, particularly NGOs—or in some instances, devolving con-
trol entirely.15 Such developments blur the lines separating state, for-proªt, and
non-proªt actors.
In the context of global neoliberalism institutions like states, corporations,
multi-lateral ªnancial institutions and conservation BINGOs are increas-
ingly interlinked by dense networks of actors, ideas and money. In fact, it
has become increasingly difªcult to distinguish where these institutions end
and the networks that connect them begin.16
Changes in the state are reºected by changes in NGOs, which have upscaled to
connect with national governments and international institutions, while dis-
connecting with grassroots.17
Second, the view that the only way to save nature is by turning to busi-
nesses and market mechanisms is spreading, and programs aiming to com-
modify nature in order to save it are expanding.18 Conservation has long pro-
moted market solutions, yet it has never before been so enthusiastic about the
possibilities of capitalism as it is today. Keynote speeches at the most important
conservation conferences urge audience members to engage with business and
business models, touting carbon credits, wetlands offsets, ecotourism, and other
market schemes as the most effective way to save biodiversity while simulta-
neously saving the economy.19 Much of this relies on ªnding new ways of turn-
ing protected biodiversity into tradable commodities, particularly by repackag-
ing it through representation and symbols.20
As detailed below, conservation has become neoliberalized because of the
desire of key neoliberal actors (states, corporations, international ªnancial insti-
tutions) to use conservation to their own advantage, and because of active repo-
sitioning by conservation actors to better ªt and make themselves more
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13. MacDonald 2010.
14. Brockington and Duffy 2010; and Igoe and Brockington 2007.
15. Brockington and Duffy 2010.
16. Brockington and Duffy 2010, 439.
17. Brockington, Duffy and Igoe. 2008; MacDonald 2010; and Sachedina 2010.
18. Brockington and Duffy 2010; and McAfee 1999.
19. Igoe, Neves and Brockington. 2010; and MacDonald 2010.
20. Igoe, Neves and Brockington 2010.
inºuential in a neoliberal world.21 Rolled-back states have looked toward NGOs
to ªll the gap in service provision.22 The rise of neoliberal thinking correlates
with the rise in size and stature of NGOs.23 Large NGOs have changed their dis-
courses and practice, particularly engaging with business, to expand and im-
prove their work, following what they consider to be the best way to conserve
biodiversity.24 Neoliberalized conservation has replaced a situation in which
NGOs were smaller and more distant from corporations and the state, and al-
though not necessarily critical of capitalism, certainly less enthusiastic.
Ideas on elites and neoliberal conservation are not incompatible. The
transnational conservation elite reºects both. It is described below as a broad
coalition of elite actors from a range of backgrounds and constituencies, who
promote saving biodiversity through repositioning the state, corporations, and
NGOs and through market mechanisms. Literatures on elites and on neoliberal
conservation both discuss the increased power of NGOs and the blurring
boundaries among state, for-proªt, and non-proªt sectors. Elites and neoliberal-
ism have been successfully studied simultaneously,25 and many studies of
neoliberal conservation have emphasized the importance of elites.26
The crisis of global biodiversity loss is real and serious, and highly moti-
vated conservationists have developed ever more complex methods and struc-
tures to counter it and to fund their efforts. Critiques of the politics, social im-
pacts, and neoliberalization of conservation have been controversial, but they
rarely aim to undermine the efforts of conservationists or diminish the vital
challenge of reversing biodiversity loss. Indeed, conservation has become neo-
liberalized and the transnational conservation elite has emerged precisely be-
cause key actors believe these are the most effective means of tackling this crisis;
the expansion of NGOs and protected areas is testimony to their success. This
article is not an ad hominem attack on the mission or integrity of conservation-
ists, but an exploration of their work and the consequences of their strategies.
The following sections outline the different constituencies that make up
the transnational conservation elite, covering NGOs, the state, corporations, sci-
ence, and media. Despite this distinction among different types of actors, the
movement of ideas, inºuence, and individuals across constituencies has blurred
boundaries so that the elite should be considered as a collective. This elite func-
tions through personal contacts, often deliberately cultivated. It works as ideas
are swapped and lobbying happens at meetings, conferences, and social occa-
sions and through the creation of joint projects involving different actors in the
elite.
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21. Büscher 2008.
22. Brockington and Duffy 2010.
23. Brockington and Scholªeld 2010.
24. MacDonald 2010.
25. Sklair 2000.
26. Corson 2010; Holmes 2010; MacDonald 2010; and Spierenberg and Wels 2010.
NGOs in Globalized Conservation
Large conservation NGOs could be considered the originators of global conser-
vation and they are principal actors in its current form. Since their inception
over a century ago, they have mobilized political and ªnancial support from
one location to create protected areas in distant places.27 Excluding a few
younger organizations such as the UN Environment Programme, NGOs are the
only organizations with global manifestoes on environmental issues and the
only ones focusing speciªcally on biodiversity conservation. They have long
beneªted from being seen as the most capable actors in conserving biodiversity
globally, becoming entrusted with prominent roles in global treaties and struc-
tures.28 Crucially, NGOs lead conservation thinking: they employ large numbers
of conservation scientists, and they produce the most innovative research as
well as key papers and editorials in leading journals on biodiversity and be-
yond.29 This ideological inºuence belies their political and ªnancial weakness
relative to states, international institutions, or corporations. Their position is
strengthened by claiming to be neutral, expert, honest brokers, a view actively
cultivated by representing themselves as always successful and as the best bul-
wark against corporate environmental damage.30 While most large international
conservation NGOs originated previously, the rise of neoliberalism in the 1990s
allowed NGOs to grow in size and inºuence and to globalize; they came to be
promoted as providers of services and were given power and money to replace
the state in many areas.31
There is a consensus that the size, mobility, and inºuence of the few larg-
est international conservation NGOs mark them as different from other organi-
zations.32 Their directors and senior staff lie at the heart of the transnational
conservation elite. These NGOs are characterized by their global-scale aims and
operations and their contacts with politicians, bureaucrats, scientists, and the
media which allow them to inºuence conservation thought and practice. NGOs
in this category include WWF-US and WWF-International, The Nature Conser-
vancy, African Wildlife Foundation, Wildlife Conservation Society, Conserva-
tion International (CI), the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and Birdlife In-
ternational. Although these organizations have historical roots in local issues
and campaigns, over the last two decades they have consciously become global
actors: changing their structure, detaching themselves from local issues, and
gaining access to the political and ªnancial resources of contemporary global-
ization, particularly those associated with development aid and international
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27. Adams 2005; and Mackenzie 1988.
28. Princen and Finger 1994.
29. Da Fonseca 2003.
30. Corson 2010; and Igoe, Neves and Brockington. 2010.
31. Mitlin, Hickey and Bebbington 2007; and Scholªeld and Brockington 2008.
32. Chapin 2004; Da Fonseca 2003; Igoe and Brockington 2007; Rodriguez et al. 2007; and
Scholªeld and Brockington 2008.
ªnancial institutions (see below).33 Tellingly, of the ten conservation NGOs
who spend the most money in Africa, only one has its headquarters in the conti-
nent.34
There are sufªcient connections and contacts between the boards of these
large conservation NGOs to consider them collectively as a community. First,
directors and senior staff move between different organizations or sit concur-
rently on multiple NGO boards. New NGOs are sometimes created from ªs-
sures within others—Conservation International was formed by disenfran-
chised directors of The Nature Conservancy, augmented later by defectors from
WWF.35 Second, they interact at conferences such as the World Parks Congress
and through joint initiatives created to coordinate lobbying and strategies.36
Third, directors from different NGOs interact by sitting on the board of a third
organization, mirroring the strategies of corporate directors who sit on multiple
boards to gain access to a greater number of inºuential people and to maintain
close links to their peers.37
Close connections between leading ªgures allow ideas to spread, forming
a relatively homogenous set of practices. Many NGOs share similar attitudes
and relationships with corporations, and copy one another’s fundraising strate-
gies.38 Big NGOs represent nature and solutions to its preservation in very simi-
lar ways.39 In recent years, large NGOs have all scaled up their fundraising and
operational focus to encompass entire landscapes, promoting similar ideas un-
der different brand names (such as “hotspot” or “ecoregion”).40 Alongside
transfrontier protected areas and biodiversity corridors, such large-scale projects
reinforce the dominance of large NGOs while excluding smaller ones, on the
premise that only large NGOs have the resources and ability to work at such
scales. These projects are considered particularly neoliberal because of the
prominence of market mechanisms within them, and because many involve de-
volving control of protected areas to NGOs.41
Supportive States in Transnational Conservation
The neoliberalization of conservation has altered relationships between states
and NGOs. With increasing devolution of control and implementation of cer-
tain policy areas, states are creating new arenas for work and new areas of
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33. Birchard 2005; Corson 2010; MacDonald 2010; and Sachedina 2010.
34. Brockington and Scholªeld 2010.
35. Chapin 2004.
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large NGOs suggests they self-identify as a global network
37. Rothkopf 2008; and Sklair 2000.
38. Chapin 2004; and Dowie 1995.
39. Igoe forthcoming.
40. Rodriguez et al. 2007.
41. Büscher and Whande 2007; and Grandia 2007.
inºuence for NGOs, who are invited to replace the reduced state in implement-
ing conservation because of their perceived expertise relative to the state.42 Inter-
national development agencies have encouraged NGOs to work on issues where
Southern states are perceived to be weak or reluctant to act, which has beneªted
conservation NGOs.43 As the CEO of the African Wildlife Foundation put it,
“Basically, AWF is becoming an extension arm of USAID in Africa.”44
Although neoliberal shifts in governance may drive the devolution of
some state activities to NGOs, personal contacts shape which actors have inºu-
ence and a position in resulting structures and processes, in both development45
and conservation. Conservation NGOs carefully foster close personal relation-
ships with state actors as a strategy to earn support.46 Many personal contacts are
cultivated by movement of personnel, from former heads of state joining NGO
boards to exchanges at lower ranks, increasing NGOs’ lobbying ability. Such
movement makes it difªcult to distinguish between who works for the state or
NGOs, blurring boundaries between the sectors. NGOs take politicians and se-
nior bureaucrats on trips to foreign parks to campaign for international devel-
opment funding for biodiversity.47 Close contacts between key bureaucrats and
directors of large NGOs were allegedly pivotal in creating the global ban on
trading ivory.48 Close connections between NGOs and heads of state have
driven rapid growth of protected areas in Gabon, the Dominican Republic, and
Costa Rica.49
Conservation NGOs have similarly cultivated relationships with multilat-
eral organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank, following
increased interaction between these organizations and NGOs generally.50 Per-
sonnel have been exchanged, from board level down to movement of technical
experts. Importantly, these organizations have been under pressure to green
their activities. Lacking conservation expertise or experience, they have turned to
NGOs for help, giving them money, political inºuence, and key roles in
biodiversity structures and treaties.51 With the rise of community conservation,
NGOs have reclassiªed their activities as “development,” increasing their poten-
tial for donor agency funding.52 Multilateral donors provided 27.7 percent of in-
ternational conservation funding during the late 1990s in Latin America, the
biggest source of funds.53
Close connections have fostered two-way exchanges of ideas and dis-
8 • Conservation’s Friends in High Places
42. Corson 2010.
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44. Sachedina 2010, 608.
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46. Corson 2010; and Sachedina 2010.
47. Corson 2010.
48. Bonner 1993.
49. Boza 1993; Garland 2008; and Holmes 2010.
50. Fisher 1997; Jepson 2005; and Mitlin, Hickey, and Bebbington. 2007.
51. Goldman 2001; Kull 1996; and Princen and Finger 1994.
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courses, reinforcing the position of NGOs. NGOs have shifted to supporting
free market conservation promoted by multilateral donors, who have in turn
adopted NGOs’ discourses (such as “ecoregions”), and use NGOs’ criteria and
standards to assess the success of the conservation projects they fund.54
Corporate Elites and Conservation Elites
Corporate funding for conservation NGOs is increasing, driving the rapid
growth of some large NGOs.55 An important and common critique is that
NGOs are reticent to criticize the environmental record of their corporate do-
nors.56 Yet corporations provide only around 10 percent of funds for large
NGOs.57 A more signiªcant form of inºuence comes from corporate domina-
tion of NGO boards. Fifteen of the twenty-six board members at The Nature
Conservancy are or have been directors of large transnational corporations, as
have twenty-six of thirty-six board members at CI and thirteen of twenty-one at
WWF-US.58 In all cases, directors with a corporate management background
have displaced and now greatly outnumber those with biological training or
other “technical” backgrounds. In addition, these NGOs each have a business
council, made exclusively from corporate directors, to advise the board of direc-
tors.
Corporate directors were invited to join NGO boards to bring in manage-
ment expertise and allow NGOs access to the corporate world. This has success-
fully facilitated ºows of ideas and inºuence from corporations into conserva-
tion. NGOs have adopted corporate strategies and structures, often copied
directly from companies controlled by board members, engaging in corporate
practices of consolidation and expansion. Such strategies have been key to the
growth and international expansion of the largest conservation NGOs which
have created special units staffed by business experts to better engage with
corporations.59 Corporations in turn are attracted by the business opportuni-
ties created by emerging markets in nature and by opportunities for green-
washing.60
Although closer corporate ties and the adoption of corporate practices
have increased NGOs’ inºuence and ªnances, these practices have also purport-
edly made them less inclined to criticize companies with whom they have links,
and more likely to pursue expansion for its own sake rather than to better pro-
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59. Birchard 2005; and MacDonald 2010.
60. Igoe, Neves, and Brockington 2010.
tect biodiversity.61 Increased corporate involvement has also coincided with in-
creased promotion by NGOs of corporate solutions to conservation problems,
advocating neoliberal strategies of commodifying nature to save it, such as car-
bon credits and luxury ecotourism.62
Philanthropic foundations, linked to corporations through their origins,
funding, board membership, and pro-corporate outlook, represent a signiªcant,
growing, and under-theorized source of indirect corporate inºuence on conser-
vation.63 Like corporations, foundations exchange personnel, ideas, and money
with conservation NGOs, working through personal contacts. Foundations are
the second largest income source for the NGO sector in the United States, giv-
ing US$ 1 billion annually, most notably touching conservation through the
US$ 261 million Moore Foundation grant to CI.64 Conservationists deliberately
cultivate close relationships with foundations and the philanthropists behind
them to increase their incomes.65 A growing trend in conservation philanthropy
is rich individuals creating private protected areas, which occupy more land
than state conservation areas in some countries.66
Science and Knowledge in the Transnational Conservationist Elite
Knowledge supports and reinvigorates conservation, giving practitioners new
and better ways of acting, in new places, with new arguments and justiªcations.
Producers and disseminators of ideas are important in the conservation elite,
closely linked to NGOs and bureaucracies. NGOs have great ability to produce
knowledge and to use it to get resources and shape conservation practice.
Much knowledge is in the form of science, which conservationists use (or claim
to use) to plan effective actions. NGOs produce more conservation research,
with greater policy impact, than universities.67 Science produces key concepts
underpinning conservation (biodiversity, endemism, ecosystem, endangered)
and ways of measuring them, which are used by NGOs as calls for action (and
consequently money and inºuence). Such concepts do not translate easily or
unaltered into policy, but they permit new arguments and ways of acting, giving
new power to conservationists.
Alongside natural sciences, social science has contributed to conservation
knowledge, particularly since the rise of community conservation.68 Debates on
community conservation have been overly reliant on simplistic narratives, using
a few well-known case studies to demonstrate apparently universal truths.69 By
extension, this makes the few individuals behind these studies particularly in-
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ºuential; the rise of community conservation in East Africa was largely attribut-
able to a few charismatic, dynamic, and well-connected knowledge producers.70
The connections among knowledge producers, NGOs, and bureaucracies make
them particularly inºuential—particularly individuals who combine research
and advocacy, such as David Western, Jane Goodall, and George Schaller.
Celebrities, the Media, and Conservation Elites
Transnational conservation depends on particular representations of biodi-
versity, nature, and conservation to spread a positive view of conservation and
promote its fundamental values. Conservationists beneªt greatly from being
widely seen as good people, heroically doing essential work towards an intrinsi-
cally worthwhile goal, and from representations of nature in books, ªlm, and
television as endangered, exotic, non-human, and uncontroversial.71 These rep-
resentations, sometimes consciously cultivated by NGOs through media tie-ins,
ªlter into public understandings of biodiversity, creating public support for con-
servation and ªnancial and political resources for conservation NGOs. Recently,
representations have had a neoliberal turn, promoting messages that nature can
best be saved through consumption, such as CI partnering with McDonald’s to
produce Endangered Species Happy Meals.72
Among the transnational conservation elite are “celebrity conservation-
ists”: high proªle individuals who embody and promote the idea of conserva-
tion and who can inºuence public and elite opinion. They include ªlm actors
promoting conservation, presenters of TV nature programs, well-known conser-
vation practitioners, and even ªctional characters such as Tarzan.73 Celebrities
sustain global conservation and the transnational conservationist elite by delib-
erately or inadvertently promoting it as an idea to be supported ªnancially and
politically. Many have high-proªle involvement with conservation NGOs. Their
inºuence can be directly linked to the success of various conservation projects.74
Yet this media and celebrity support is for certain forms of conservation; by pre-
senting ideas of nature as distant, separate from humans, they promotes strate-
gies such as protected areas at the expense of quotidian nature at home, inte-
grated with society. The transnational conservation elite can use media and
celebrity to ensure they are seen as natural leaders in conservation, and promote
ideas which support and maintain themselves.
Transnational Conservation Elite at Work and Play
The transnational conservation elite functions through personal interactions
which allow for the exchange of ideas, money, and inºuence. Much of this oc-
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curs in formal spaces, such as boardrooms, government and donor agency of-
ªces, and conferences such as the World Conservation Congress. Yet it also hap-
pens in very social spaces—just as business executives go to great lengths to
maximize lobbying and networking opportunities at social functions and on
golf courses,75 the transnational conservation elite use informal occasions as
prime places of advocacy and fundraising. The following vignettes show some
of these interactions in more detail, drawing on various ethnographies of con-
servation. They are selected to demonstrate typical ways in which elite members
interact, and because the ªrst two and last involve pioneers of strategies that
have been widely copied within global conservation.
The International Conservation Caucus
Despite intense competition for funding, conservation NGOs often coordinate
on matters of mutual interest. The neoliberal transition of USAID in the 1980s
and 1990s, from a deliverer of development programs to an organization that
provides grants to others to deliver development, led USAID to give signiªcant
grants to large conservation NGOs to preserve biodiversity globally. The down-
grading of biodiversity in US foreign policy priorities in 2001 threatened this
practice, leading WWF-US, The Nature Conservancy, Wildlife Conservation So-
ciety and CI to unite to form the International Conservation Partnership, which
aimed to build broad support within the US Congress for biodiversity conserva-
tion in foreign and development policy.76 This initiative inspired the creation of
the International Conservation Caucus, one of the largest bipartisan caucuses in
the US Congress. It attracted many politicians from all sides because conserva-
tion is seen as uncontroversial, unlike other forms of environmentalism, and
because the foreign focus avoids conºicts with politicians’ domestic constituen-
cies.77 The same NGOs, allied with considerable corporate funding, created the
International Conservation Caucus Foundation (ICCF) to support the caucus,
with the mission statement:
It is our belief that as America has exported freedom, democracy, and free
enterprise, we have the ability and the interest to see that America also ex-
ports good natural resource management.78
The ICCF uses networking and close connections between conservationists and
politicians to earn continued political support and USAID spending on biodi-
versity.79 They campaign extensively, provide congressional brieªngs on conser-
vation topics, and ºy politicians to visit protected areas abroad, chaperoned by
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NGO ofªcials. There is a strong social side; NGO directors, politicians, and
other interested parties mingle at the lavish galas, receptions, and awards cere-
monies hosted by the ICCF, where garlands are given to celebrities (e.g. Harri-
son Ford), royalty (Prince Albert of Monaco) and international politicians
(Tony Blair). Business executives and others wishing to use these events to net-
work with politicians and pursue their own interests have bought tickets for
between US$ 1,000 and US$ 50,000.80 These events have been remarkably suc-
cessful in ensuring continued ªnancial and political support for conservation,
particularly the visions and projects of the largest NGOs. They are vehicles for
“colossal shifts of funds among US-based state, private and non-proªt sectors in
the name of foreign conservation, and as such, underpin a growing biodiversity
conservation enterprise.”81 During the 1990s, 70 percent of USAID biodiversity
grants for NGOs were distributed to the ªve biggest conservation NGOs.82
Corson argues that the ICCF, with its links to corporations and promotion
of market-based conservation and state rollback, epitomizes the neoliberaliza-
tion of conservation and facilitates the expansion of capitalism.83 It demon-
strates how close relationships between politicians and conservationists, operat-
ing in both professional and social spheres, underpins global conservation, and
how this has been used by the largest NGOs to consolidate their position in
global biodiversity governance.
The Strategies of Peter Seligmann
NGOs have recently moved from mass membership as the foundation of dona-
tions toward pursuing a few, high-value donors, a strategy that has brought
signiªcant success to both The Nature Conservancy and CI.84 One of conserva-
tion’s most effective fundraisers is CI chairman and CEO Peter Seligmann, re-
vered for his pioneering ability to win very large donations by cultivating close
relationships with philanthropists through social events and trips to areas of
high biodiversity, techniques now widely copied. One well-known story
unfolded when Intel founder Gordon Moore sent CI a US$ 100 check. On
recognizing the name, Seligmann wrote to and phoned an initially incredu-
lous Moore, cultivating a strong relationship that has led to subsequent grants
by Moore’s foundation of US$ 35 million and US$ 261 million (the latter by far
the largest single philanthropic grant in the history of environmentalism).85 In
another incident, Seligmann took prospective donors including pharmaceu-
ticals heir Fisk Johnson on a luxury cruise and diving trip to Melanesian coral
reefs that CI was trying to conserve. The trip, organized by Sojourns, CI’s in-
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house luxury travel ªrm created partly to run lobbying trips, was successful; pro-
spective donors signed up, making the US$ 25,000 per day yacht hire worth-
while, and Johnson joined CI’s board.86 The strategy of engaging with philan-
thropists beyond donations to include them within CI’s structure aims to
strengthen connections. Major donors who have joined CI’s board include
Gordon Moore and Wal-Mart CEO Ron Walton. Seligmann is well known for
his use of celebrities connected to CI (such as its vice president, actor Harrison
Ford) and their associated glamor to bring rich and inºuential people into the
organization. Yet while successfully generating funds, the pursuit of corporate
money and corporate directors has also prompted criticisms that the strategy
has weakened CI and other NGOs by distracting them from their core
mission.87
Michael Fay and Gabon
The West African country of Gabon has recently witnessed huge growth in pro-
tected areas and NGO spending. In 2002, it went from having no national parks
to having 13, covering more than 10 percent of the country. Gabon demon-
strates a particularly strong manifestation of both elite inºuence and conserva-
tion’s neoliberalization. A key role in the parks’ creation is attributed to Michael
Fay, an adventurer, biologist, employee of the Wildlife Conservation Society,
advisor to the ICCF, and National Geographic magazine’s “explorer in resi-
dence.” Fay travelled through Gabon in the ªnal part of his “Megatransect,” a
16-month, 1,200-mile walk transecting the Congo Basin and chronicled in
a high-proªle, three-part series in National Geographic and through regular up-
dates on the magazine’s website. Fay’s charismatic, heroic persona is the focus of
the coverage as much as Congolese biodiversity.88 On completing his journey,
he requested an audience with Gabonese President Omar Bongo to tentatively
outline a protected-area system. Bongo was so impressed by Fay, his presenta-
tion, and the potential of ecotourism to diversify the Gabonese economy that
he created all 13 proposed parks by presidential decree the same day.89 He was
also likely inºuenced by the potential for assistance through the Congo Basin
Forest Partnership, an initiative bringing together conservation NGOs, bilateral
donor agencies (particularly USAID), West African governments, and commer-
cial forest interests to fund forest and wildlife protection.90 Fay was subse-
quently invited to speak to US State Department ofªcials and members of Con-
gress, who were similarly impressed and agreed to fund the parks through
USAID. One park was opened by US Secretary of State Colin Powell, chaper-
oned on a stroll through the forest by Fay. Fay has used his celebrity as a politi-
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cal asset to gain access to and successfully lobby heads of state. His efforts echo
the case of Carl Akeley, another US naturalist exploring West Africa, who in
1925 used his fame to successfully lobby Belgian King Albert to create Africa’s
ªrst national park in the Belgian Congo.91
Gabon’s conservation is strongly neoliberal. Luxury ecotourism, an indus-
try considered neoliberal as it allows capitalism to identify and commodify new
pieces of nature despite appearing not to exploit it,92 is touted as the savior of
both Gabon’s economy and biodiversity. NGOs have been given an extremely
prominent role in planning and running the protected areas, pushed by and of-
ten funded by donor agencies. Fay’s employer, the Wildlife Conservation Soci-
ety, drafted the national ecotourism plans. Gabon is the only country outside of
the United States to host permanent ofªces of four out of the ªve biggest conser-
vation organizations (all excluding The Nature Conservancy, which has very lit-
tle presence in Africa). WWF was granted US$ 10 million by the Global Environ-
ment Facility to run one park for seven years, alongside parks in neighboring
Cameroon and Congo.93 The Gabonese state ceded partial sovereignty of pro-
tected-area policy to NGOs in exchange for their expertise and resources.
High Society and Fundraising
Cocktail parties and social functions mix conservation fundraising and lobby-
ing with other processes of networking. For example, in the Wildlife Conserva-
tion Network’s calendar of social gatherings, wealthy San Franciscans pay to at-
tend lavish fundraising cocktail parties, with the opportunity to meet and be
inspired by the conservationists whose work is being supported. A US$ 1,000
ticket to their annual Expo gala buys the opportunity to mingle with “wildlife
heroes,” including conservation celebrities such as Cynthia Moss.94 As well as
fundraisers and opportunities to meet celebrities, these events are explicitly
marketed as professional networking opportunities, chances to meet other
wealthy individuals to advance one’s own career and business opportunities.
The life and philanthropy of Anton Rupert, South African billionaire en-
trepreneur and founder of WWF-South Africa, epitomizes conservation social
networking at a global scale. Rupert, alongside his close friend Prince Bernhard
of the Netherlands, created the 1001 Club as a fundraiser for WWF. For a sub-
stantial donation, individuals or corporations who joined gained access to ex-
clusive parties and dinners where they could mingle with other rich people and
royalty.95 Conservation organizations have long pursued royal patronage to
raise their proªle and attract funding. The 1001 Club was particularly popular
with South African business executives during apartheid, allowing them to net-
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work and do business internationally while bypassing international sanctions.
Later, to support the Peace Parks Foundation, which he also founded, Rupert
created Club 21. A donation of US$ 1 million gives access to an exclusive social
club, including the Foundation’s three patrons (Rupert, Bernhard and Nelson
Mandela), and membership in the Foundation’s advisory council. The skilled
networking of both Rupert and Bernhard were central to their success in their
careers and in conservation: the clubs were an extension of their business net-
working, breaking down the distinction between fundraising for conservation
and building connections for business.96
These vignettes show three key features. First, the conservation elite is a
relatively exclusive closed circle; access to key places of lobbying and fundrais-
ing is accessible mainly through wealth, political power and social connections.
Second, conservation events involve interactions for interests other than pre-
serving biodiversity, such as networking for business executives. Inversely, con-
servation advocates can use business networking events to lobby for conserva-
tion. Third, social events allow the different constituent parts of the elite—
scientists, celebrities, NGO ofªcials, business executives, and politicians—to
network.
Global Conservation Elites and Global Conservation Hegemony
Global conservation is dominated by an elite consisting of the directors and se-
nior staff of a few large conservation NGOs, key individuals in government and
the media, donor agency and philanthropic foundation bureaucracies, inºu-
ential scientists, and celebrities. It functions through personal relationships, in-
teractions, and social networks. It is able to move money and ideas around the
globe, with strong links to other powerful bodies. Through this elite, we can ex-
plain key patterns in global conservation.
Conservation is not unique in developing an elite structure as it global-
izes. Strong parallels can be drawn between globalized conservation networks
and those dominating international development, which also revolves around
increasingly powerful NGOs, the importance of personal connections, the role
of celebrity, the importance of representation, and the inºuence of business
elites and philanthropists.97 As ideas of integrated conservation and develop-
ment emerged, conservationists easily latched onto development debates and
donors, perhaps facilitated by how smoothly they could ªt into the networked
practices of international development. Conservation NGOs have a record of
ªtting well within development structures and adapting their own structures to
ªt better.98 Similar networks and personal relationships underpin transnational
capitalism.99 Given the dominance of networked elites in various forms of glob-
alization, it is perhaps not surprising that conservation has developed a net-
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worked elite—it may be the best way to expand and strengthen the inºuence of
conservation ideas.
Furthermore, neoliberal practices have become so dominant in develop-
ment and the global economy that only those forms of conservation compatible
with neoliberalism may see their inºuence increasing. The organizations that
have adjusted their outlook and strategies to ªt best with neoliberalism—pro-
moting market solutions, taking on state functions—have grown and now dom-
inate global conservation.100 One could argue that the transnational conserva-
tion elite are the forefront of conservation’s neoliberalization. Elite interactions
allow NGOs to take on some functions of the deregulating state. Large NGOs,
through their strong connections with corporations, have introduced corporate
logics such as direct marketing and expansion strategies into conservation and
promoted market-based solutions such as ecotourism or carbon trading.101 The
elite in NGO boards are pioneering this turn to markets even as the grassroots
lag behind or resist, causing unrest inside organizations such as the IUCN and
the Nature Conservancy.102
Studies increasingly argue that certain actors and ideas in conservation
have become so dominant as to be hegemonic.103 Hegemony is the ability to
dominate thinking and practice so that particular ideas or strategies become
considered as the only feasible, possible, or conceivable options. The transna-
tional conservation elite are powerful partly because they determine key ideas
and terms used more generally, reinforcing their position. For example, conser-
vation is widely portrayed as indisputably good and unproblematic, a vision ac-
tively maintained by NGOs to ensure continued support and which is almost
never publicly challenged.104 Similarly, homogenous and positive images are
cultivated about the successes of both protected areas and large NGOs.105 For ex-
ample, debates within conservation have recently been dominated by discus-
sions of whether community-based or fortress-type protected areas are most ef-
fective.106 Yet these seemingly vibrant debates are about what type of protected
area there should be, and which particular NGOs should run them. The debate
challengers neither the idea that protected areas are the best way to preserve
biodiversity, nor that NGOs are the most capable actors to do so. Different vi-
sions of conservation that might challenge this seemingly natural way of doing
things would seem out of place.
Most discussions of hegemony in global conservation assess the domi-
nance of neoliberalized strategies that present market solutions as the only way
forward. Conservation is now considered not a bulwark against capitalist expan-
sion, but part of it.107 Much of this takes inspiration from ideas of a sustainable
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development historical bloc,108 arguing that conservation has become incorpo-
rated into global capitalism’s dominance by offering capitalist solutions to the
environmental problems created by capitalism. Conservation has had a long
and fruitful relationship with capitalism, yet advocates for market-based capital-
ism and arguments that only market-led solutions will save biodiversity have
never been so dominant.109 Given its prominent role in promoting neoliberal-
ized conservation, we must consider the transnational conservation elite when
discussing the hegemony of neoliberalized conservation.
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